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Social responsibility in gambling has become a major issue for the gaming industry. The 
possibility for online gamblers to set voluntary time and money limits is a social responsibility 
practice that is now widespread among online gaming operators. The main issue concerns 
whether the voluntary setting of such limits has any positive impact on subsequent gambling 
behaviour and whether such measures are of help to problem gamblers. In this paper, this issue is 
examined through data collected from a representative random sample of 100,000 players who 
gambled on the win2day gambling website. When opening an account at the win2day site, there is a 
mandatory requirement for all players to set time and cash-in limits (that cannot exceed 800 
Euros per week). During a three-month period, all voluntary time and/or money limit setting 
behaviour by a subsample of online gamblers (n=5000) within this mandatory framework was 
tracked and recorded for subsequent data analysis. From the 5,000 gamblers, the 10% most 
intense players (as measured by theoretical loss) were further investigated. Voluntary spending 
limits had the highest significant effect on subsequent monetary spending among casino and 
lottery gamblers.. Monetary spending among poker players significantly decreased after setting a 
voluntary time limit.. The highest significant decrease in playing duration was among poker 
players after setting a voluntary playing duration limit. The results of the study demonstrated that 
voluntary limit setting had a specific and significant effect on the studied gamblers. Therefore, 
voluntary limits appear to show voluntary limit setting had an appropriate effect in the desired 
target group (i.e., the most gaming intense players). 
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Limit setting and player choice in most intense online gamblers:  
An empirical study of online gambling behaviour 
 
Social responsibility in gambling has become a major issue for the gaming industry (Griffiths, 
Wood, Parke & Parke, 2007). To date there has been little research on the extent to which 
gaming companies are using social responsibility tools and engaging in socially responsible 
practices (Griffiths & Wood, 2008). Social responsibility practices within the gambling industry 
typically involves policies, procedures and practices that promote of responsible gaming and 
minimise problem gambling (Griffiths & Wood, 2008). A number of the social responsiility tools 
that have been incorporated by gaming companies have involved innovation in both information 
technology and technology more generally. In a recent study, Griffiths and Parke (2012) reported 
that regular gamblers endorse information technology developments as being helpful in reducing 
negative consequences associated with gambling. 
 
One such social responsibility practice is the opportunity for players to pre-set limits for the 
amount of time and money they spend on gambling per day and/or per calendar month. This is a 
practice that is now widespread among online gaming operators (Wood & Griffiths, 2010). Self-
limiting options are viewed by some gaming companies and some researchers as a method of 
putting informed player choice into place at gaming sites (Griffiths & Wood, 2008). Spending 
limit practices operated by current gaming operators come in a variety of forms. For instance, 
Wood and Griffiths (2010) reported that players’ spending can be restricted in terms of deposit 
limits, play limits, loss limits, and bet limits. More specifically: 
 
 Deposit limits – This refers to the maximum amount of money that a player can deposit 
into their play account at any given time. Winnings can either be included or excluded 
from this figure. 
 Play limits – This refers to the maximum amount of money that a player can actually play 
with at any given time. As with deposit limits, winnings can either be included or 
excluded from this figure. 
 Loss limits – This refers to the maximum amount of money that a player is allowed to lose 
at any one session. 
 Bet limits – This refers to the maximum amount of money that can be bet on a single 
game, or on concurrent games. 
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In addition to this, Wood and Griffiths (2010) also note that mandatory limits can either be fixed 
so that all games have the same limit, and/or all players have the same limit, or limits can be 
variable depending upon factors such as the type of game played, or the demonstrable wealth of 
the individual player. Furthermore, Wood and Griffiths (2010) have argued that fixed limits do 
not necessarily encourage and facilitate gamblers to take individual responsibility for managing 
and monitoring their own gambling expenditure.  
 
Despite an increasing number of gaming operators utilizing social responsibility tools and 
practices, there is very little empirical research. Arguably the first empirical study was that of 
Smeaton and Griffiths (2004). They examined a wide range of socially responsibility practices by 
30 British online gaming companies. There was a large range of bet limits across the gaming sites 
visited. The authors located only three sites that had no information about either minimum or 
maximum bet size. The minimum bet size found was £1, whereas the maximum located (of the 
sites that set an upper limit) was £20,000. Many of the sites typically had £10 to £25 minimum 
bets, and £250 to £1000 maximum bets. Smeaton and Griffiths argued that the larger the bet 
limit, the more chance that gamblers can run up debts that they cannot afford. 
 
To date, and as far as the authors are aware, there is no empirical evidence to show that either 
higher mandatory spend limits or player self-set limits are associated with increased levels of 
problem gambling in either online or offline settings. Broda, LaPlante, Nelson, LaBrie, Bosworth 
and Shaffer (2008) examined the effects of player deposit limits on Internet sports betting by 
customers of bwin Interactive Entertainment. Their study examined 47,000 subscribers to bwin 
over a period of two years and compared the behaviour of players who tried to exceed their 
deposit limit with all other players. Deposit limit referred to the amount of money deposited into 
a player’s spend account excluding any accumulated winnings. At the time of initial data 
collection in 2005, bwin set a mandatory deposit limit of no more than €1000 per day or €5000 
per 30 days. Players could also set their own deposit limits (per 30 days) below the mandatory 
limits.  
 
Overall, the study found that less than 1% of the players (0.3%) attempted to exceed their deposit 
limit. However, Wood and Griffiths (2010) argued that the large mandatory limit may be the 
main reason for this finding as LaPlante at al (2008) noted that the majority of online gamblers 
never reached the maximum deposit limit. In fact, 95% of the players never deposited more than 
€1050 per 30 days (i.e., one-fifth of the €5000 maximum). Furthermore, LaPlante and colleagues 
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did not distinguish between those who attempted to exceed either their own personally set 
deposit limits or mandatory limits. A Canadian study among Nova Scotian video lottery players 
found that responsible gaming (RG) features (including player set spend limits) generally reduced 
the overall levels of player expenditure (Focal Research, 2007). However, as Wood and Griffiths 
(2010) note, the specific impact of the player set spend limit was not separated from the impact 
of the other RG features. 
 
A study of 10,865 online gamblers from 96 different countries by the International Gaming 
Research Unit (2007) reported that over two-thirds of players (70%) thought that voluntary 
spending limits would be a useful RG feature. Further focus group work from the same study 
found that the majority of players were opposed to mandatory spend limits. Mandatory spend 
limits were viewed by the focus groups as patronizing and overly restrictive. Bernhard, Lucas and 
Jang (2006) reported similar findings in their focus groups of Las Vegas gamblers. In this study, 
mandatory spend limits were strongly opposed, whereas player-set limits were more widely 
regarded as useful. However, problematic and pathological gamblers who are increasingly losing 
control of their time and money spending are not susceptible to voluntary responsible gaming 
features. This group of gamblers can effectively be protected by setting mandatory limits. 
Jurisdictions, like the one in Austria, often introduce these mandatory limits to protect the most 
vulnerable. The only way for the player to continue is to choose other gaming sites which do not 
protect players with mandatory limits. As appropriate prevention tools voluntary responsible 
gaming features require a certain level of self-awareness. Players should be introduced to 
responsible gaming from the very start of their gambling during registration on a specific site. 
Ideally they should be made familiar with videos, tutorials or other information material. 
 
Griffiths, Wood and Parke (2009) carried out a study among Svenska Spel clientele examining 
players’ attitudes and behaviour towards using social responsibility tools among 2,348 online 
gamblers (all clientele of Svenska Spel) who completed an online survey. The most useful feature 
was the setting of spending limits with over two-thirds of respondents (70%) reporting the 
feature to be ‘quite useful’ or ‘very useful’. Respondents were also asked which social 
responsibility features (if any) they had used. Over half (56%) had used spending limits. Given 
the lack of empirical evidence on spending limits and whether they actually help in the prevention 
of problem gambling, the following study investigates the spending behaviour of online gamblers 
before and after they set themselves spend limits.  
 
 





Participants: Data were collected from a representative random sample of 100,000 players who 
gambled on the win2day gambling website during a three-month test period. This sample 
comprised 5,000 registered gamblers who chose to set themselves limits while playing on win2day. 
 
Gambling website description and procedure: The authors were given access to a large anonymized data 
set by a commercial gaming operator (win2day Entwicklungs- und Betriebsgesellschaft m.b.H), the online 
casino and lottery portal of Österreichische Lotterien GmbH and Casinos Austria AG. win2day has been 
online since 2003. win2day offers a wide range of lottery and casino games (as well as poker) to 
Austrian citizens. During the registration process, there is a mandatory requirement for all players 
to set time and cash-in limits. Furthermore, the weekly cash-in limit cannot exceed 800 Euros at 
any time during and after registration. Following registration, players can change the value of the 
weekly limit at any time (up to the mandatory 800 Euro per week limit). Limit increases only 
become effective after a 72-hour cooling off period. For instance, the player can limit the daily, 
weekly and/or monthly cash-in amount and the playing duration. The latter can be limited per 
playing session and/or per day. win2day protects its players by limiting the maximum cash-in 
amount per week at €800. Furthermore win2day offers additional responsible gaming features 
such as self-exclusion options (where players can temporarily or permanently self-exclude from 
gambling at win2day), educational content (e.g., video films including information on the nature of 
gambling and signs of problematic gambling), and a problem gambling diagnostic self-test 
(comprising questions similar to DSM-IV criteria). In the three-month test period, all voluntary 
limit setting behaviour by online gamblers was tracked and recorded for subsequent data analysis.  
 
Monetary spending: Monetary spending was measured via theoretical loss. As shown in a recent 
study (i.e., Auer & Griffiths, 2012), the theoretical loss is the most accurate and robust indicator 
of gambling intensity with regard to monetary involvement. The theoretical loss is computed as 
the product of bet size and house-advantage for each game being played. As Auer and Griffiths 
(2012) have demonstrated, the theoretical loss should always be used when gamblers with 
different gambling habits are being compared in terms of their involvement. The higher the 
theoretical loss, the higher the gambling involvement in terms of monetary spending. The 
computation of the theoretical loss as the product of bet size and house-advantage was applied to 
all games (e.g.,lottery games, casino games) with the exception of poker. Monetary ispending for 
poker was measured using the rake. The rake is a fixed percentage of the monetary bet that goes 
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to the casino. In this study, poker refers to “social” poker in which gamblers compete with each 
other. This is clearly differentiated from ‘video poker’ which is a pure game of chance and thus a 
casino game. Previous studies have incorrectly tended to use bet size as a proxy measure of 
gambling involvement. As Auer and Griffiths have conclusively shown, bet size does not 
accurately take into account the house advantage of games and thus cannot be used to compare 
gamblers nor should it be ever used as a measure of individual gambling intensity. Auer and 
Griffiths also showed the same finding for when the number of games being played was used as a 
proxy measure of gaming intensity.  
 
In this study, the effect of voluntary limit setting was calculated via the limit impact factor. To do 
this, the percentage change before and after the 30-day period after the limit was set was 
calculated. For the theoretical loss, the formula is as follows: impact factor = (theoretical loss 30 
days after divided by the theoretical loss 30 days before). An impact factor greater then ‘1’ 
corresponds to a behavioural increase, and an impact factor less than ‘0’ corresponds to a 
behavioural decrease. The effect if limit setting was studied by means of the 10% most intense 
players. This group of most intense players was identified by means of the behaviour (as 
measured by theoretical loss) in the 30 days before the limit was set. This approach to calculating 
‘gaming intensity’ is a crucial factor when it came to the interpretation of limit setting 
effectiveness. Limits were deemed to have a significant effect if the mean theoretical loss or the 
mean playing duration after the limit setting event significantly decreased compared to before the 
limit setting event. 
 
Data analysis: The data analysis was performed with the statistical package “R”. The analysis 
focused on the voluntary limit setting events following the registration process. Given the large 
number of statistical tests performed, significance levels were set at the 1% level. Mean changes 
in gambling behaviour before and after voluntary limit setting were performed via t-tests (by 
comparing the means of both theoretical loss and play duration before and after the limit setting 
events). Furthermore, changes in gambling behaviour were analysed overall and separately for 
casino, lottery and poker gambling. Only the 10% most intense gamblers among each game type 
were taken into account. This subsegment of gamblers was chosen because they showed the 
highest losses based on their bet size and the types of games played (and therefore were arguably 
the ones who most need to set limits). A high theoretical loss can either occur through high bet 
sizes, through playing games with a high house advantage, or a combination of both. Lottery 
games have higher house advantages than casino games and thus lead to a higher theoretical loss. 
This might seem counter-intuitive as casino games are more problematic due to their event 
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frequency. However, most of the time, the high theoretical loss of lottery games is compenstated 
by the low event frequency and low bet frequency that lottery gamblers usually show. Poker was 
taken into account via the rake, which as explained above is a fixed percentage of the stake that 
the player pays to the casino. A number of studies (e.g., Currie, Hodgins, Casey, et al. 2011) have 
shown that casino games correlate with increased harm. For that reason analysis was also 




Findings relating to the total sample 
Effect of voluntary limit setting among the total sample: During the three-month test period, the sample 
of 5,000 gamblers produced a total of 22,002 limit setting acts (see Table 1). The mean number of 
limit setting acts per online gambler was 4.4 (SD=4.3). However, it should be noted that the 
changing of one limit can also result in the automatic changing of another. For instance, the 
monthly cash-in limit often determines a change in the weekly (as well as daily) cash-in limit. If 
the monthly cash-in limit is changed to €800, the weekly and daily cash-in limit cannot exceed 
that value. The same holds for the setting of play duration limits. Limiting the cash-in limit 
should consequently lead to a decreased playing behaviour either with respect to money spent or 
time spent.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In addition to theoretical loss, the following analysis also uses the playing duration as another 
measure of gambling intensity. In order to compute the playing duration for a certain time 
period, single playing sessions had to be identified. It was decided that the number of consecutive 
games belonged to one playing session if they were maximally 30 minutes apart. Therefore, a time 
gap of more than 30 minutes led to the recording of a new (and therefore separate) game session. 
The daily play duration corresponded to the sum of all sessions on that particular day. The 
playing duration for a specific time period corresponded to the sum of all daily playing durations 
for that time period. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 shows the limit impact factor with regard to theoretical loss in the group of most intense 
players and the five types of limit. Using t-tests, the results showed that the 10% most gaming 
intense players produced significantly less theoretical loss in the 30 days following voluntary limit 
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setting (see Table 2). The 10% most gaming intense players that chose a monthly cash-in limit 
produced 86% of the theoretical loss compared to 30 days before the limiting event. The setting 
of voluntary time limits also had a significant impact on spending behaviour than monetary limits 
although not as much as the setting of monetary limits (see Table 2). The 10% most gaming 
intense players that chose a daily playing duration limit produced 90% of the theoretical loss 
compared to 30 days before voluntary limit setting.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 shows the impact of voluntary limit setting with regard to playing duration in the group 
of most intense players and the five types of limits. The results showed that the 10% most 
gaming intense players were playing significantly less often in the 30 days after setting voluntary 
time limits but only when choosing a daily duration limit. That is, in the 30 days after the limit 
setting event, the 10% most intense players that chose a daily playing duration limit spent 92% of 
the time playing compared to the 30 days before the limiting event. The setting of daily and 
weekly cash-in limits were almost significant at the 1% level in reducing play duration. Therefore, 
overall effect of setting voluntary limits on playing duration was less pronounced (and less 
significant) than the effect of voluntary limit setting on theoretical loss.  
 
Findings relating to the subsamples of lottery, casino and poker players 
The following analysis examined whether there were groups of players who differed with regard 
to the effect of limit setting. The data provided by win2day also contained data about which 
specific games the gamblers were playing. Therefore, subsequent analysis examined gamblers who 
played lottery, casino, and poker games. However, it must be noted the analysis were not 
mutually exclusive. Players who engaged in one type of gambling often engaged in other forms 
too. 
 
Effect of voluntary limit setting among lottery players: Of the 5,000 gamblers who set limits within the 
three-month test period, 3,152 gamblers played lottery games (such as Lotto 6/45 and 
scratchcards). This sub-sample of 3,152 lottery gamblers carried out 12,222 acts of voluntary limit 
setting. The number and percentage of the various limits chosen is shown in Table 1. This shows 
that the distribution was very similar to the overall number and percentage of limits set in (see 
also Table 1). The number of limits per player was 3.9 (SD=3.9). In order to show the impact of 
limit setting on time and money spent gambling, the 10% most intense gamblers were identified 
using the theoretical loss produced in lottery games in the 30 days before voluntary limit setting. 
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Table 2 again shows that the theoretical loss significantly decreased among the top 10% most 
gaming intense lottery players in the 30 days following all types of voluntary limit setting. The 
impact of the cash-in limits was higher than playing duration limits (Table 3).  
 
Effect of voluntary limit setting among casino players: Out of the sample 5,000 gamblers who chose to set 
themselves limits in the three-month test period, 2,344 gamblers played casino games (such as 
slot games, video poker and cards). These 2,344 gamblers carried out 10,733 acts of voluntary 
limit setting. The number and percentage of the various limits chosen is shown in Table 1. This 
shows that the distribution was very similar to the overall number and percentage of limits (see 
also Table 1). The number of limits per player was 4.6 (SD=4.9). In order to show the impact of 
limit setting on time and money spent gambling, the 10% most intense players were identified 
using the theoretical loss produced in casino games in the 30 days before voluntary limit setting. 
Table 2 shows that the theoretical loss, this time in casino games, significantly decreased in the 
top 10% of gaming intense players with respect to the theoretical loss in casino games in the 30 
days prior to voluntary monetary limit setting (for daily, weekly and monthly cash-in limits). 
However, the setting of voluntary duration limits among casino players had no significant effect 
on theoretical loss after the limit setting event. Casino players showed a more significant decrease 
than the general population of gamblers. Casino gamblers who set themselves weekly cash-in 
limits spent 77% of the theoretical loss 30 days after voluntary limit setting compared to the 
theoretical loss 30 days prior. This is by far the most significant impact that limit setting had on 
gambling behaviour. 
 
Table 3 shows that in general there was no significant decrease in play duration among casino 
players following voluntary limit setting (except for those who set monthly cash-in limits). The 
top 10% of most gaming intense casino players showed decreases in playing duration after 
voluntary limit setting that approached statistical significance for those who set voluntary daily 
and weekly cash-in but were non-significant for those who set session and daily duration limits.  
 
Effect of voluntary limit setting among poker players: Out of the sample 5,000 gamblers who chose to set 
themselves limits in the thre-month test period, 759 gamblers played poker games (such as Texas 
Hold ‘Em and Five Card Draw). These 759 gamblers carried out 2,893 acts of voluntary limit 
setting. The number and percentage of the various limits chosen is shown in Table 1. The 
number of limits per person was 3.8 (SD=3.6). In order to show the impact of limit setting on 
time and money spent gambling, the 10% most intense poker players were created using the 
theoretical loss produced in poker games in the 30 days before voluntary limit setting. Table 2 
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shows that poker rake decreased in the top 10% of gaming intense players in the 30 days 
following voluntary limit setting. However, this was only significant for those who set weekly 
monetary limits, and session and daily play duration limits (although the setting of daily and 
monthly monetary limits approached significance). Therefore, the decrease in rake for the top 
10% of players was larger for time limits than for money limits. For instance, poker players who 
set themselves a daily playing duration limit only spent 73% of the rake they previously spent.  
 
Table 3 shows that the setting of voluntary session and daily duration limits had a highly 
significant effect on overall play duration following the limit setting event. The voluntary setting 
of daily cash-in limits lowered play duration and approached statistical significance. The setting of 
weekly and monthly cash-in limits had no significant on poker play duration. Poker players who 
set themselves a daily playing duration limit only spent 70% of the time they used to spend 
playing poker. The analysis showed that intense poker gamblers changed their behaviour in a 
positive way after they set time rather than money limits.  
 
Differences in limit setting between lottery, casino and poker players: The frequency of limit setting was 
different between the three types of player. Figure 1 show the 95% confidence intervals for the 
mean number of limit events per game type. Lottery (M=3.88; SD=3.89; t=-8.62, p<0.001) and 
poker players (M=3.81; SD=3.36; t=-9.71, p<0.001) had a significantly lower number of limit 
events than the total population (M=4.40; SD=4.29). Lottery (t=-6.93; p<0.001) and poker 
players (t=-7.58, p<0.001) were also significantly different from casino players (M=4.58; 
SD=4.90). Casino players tended to set more limits, but were not significantly different from the 
total population as the confidence intervals overlapped (t=1.76, p=0.78).  
 




The results of this study clearly show that overall, voluntary limit setting had a specific and 
statistically significant effect on high intensity gamblers. Therefore, the study shows that 
voluntary limit setting had an appropriate effect in the desired target group (i.e., the most gaming 
intense players). More specifically, the analysis showed that (in general) gaming intense players 
specifically changed their behaviour in a positive way after they limited themselves with respect to 
both time and money spent. In most of the analyses (with the exception of poker players), the 
setting of voluntary time duration limits were less important than voluntary monetary limits. The 
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results would seem to confirm the speculation made by Wood and Griffiths (2010) that voluntary 
time limits would be less effective than voluntary spending limits in changing gambling behaviour 
for the better among problem gamblers (assuming that the most gaming intense players in this 
study included problem gamblers). 
 
Although the daily playing duration showed the highest impact on time spent gambling, there 
were no significant differences between voluntary cash-in and playing duration limits in overall 
time spent gambling following the limit setting event. The overall effect of limit setting on 
playing duration was much less than the overall effect on money spent. However, this might also 
be due to the fact that the distribution of monetary parameters was far more skewed and prone 
to outliers than the distribution of time parameters because the latter have natural lower and 
upper boundaries. For example the maximum daily time spend cannot exceed 24 hours.   
 
It should also be noted that lottery games in general showed a very low frequency of play. Lotto 
is a very popular game but typically consists of players choosing the stake size and playing the 
game once or twice in a specified time period (e.g., once or twice a week). Therefore, there is a 
question as to whether setting limits (particularly time limits) would be of benefit as this study 
showed that limit setting by lottery players does not affect play duration. This would appear to be 
intuitively correct given that the structural characteristics (particularly event frequency) of bi-
weekly lotteries would be unlikely to cause problems for players as compared to slot machines 
where event frequency can be very high (e.g., up to 30 times a minute), and which are known to 
have an association with problem gambling (e.g., Parke & Griffiths, 2006; 2007, Meyer, Hayer & 
Griffiths, 2009). That a limit on duration of session is irrelevant for playing the lottery has already 
been mentioned by Currie, Hodgins, Wang, el-Guebaly and Wynne, (2008). Given that the play 
duration for lottery games is typically much less than for casino or poker games, it could be 
argued that the setting of time limits is not needed for thr playing of discontinuous lottery games. 
 
As outlined above, casino games (especially slot machine games) tend to have a very high event 
frequency and can be problematic for certain vulnerable groups of players (Meyer, et al, 2009). 
Given this association, it was pleasing that the results showed that voluntary monetary limit 
setting among players of these types of game showed highly significant decreases in the money 
lost as a direct result of voluntary limit setting. Among poker players, voluntary time limits 
showed a larger effect on the rake than monetary limits. Poker players were the only group where 
such an effect was observed. Given that playing poker is a more time intensive game than almost 
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all other forms of gambling, it could be argued that voluntary limit setting impacting most on 
duration of play is a desirable outcome of limit setting in this particular type of player. 
 
Overall – and excluding poker players – the analysis of the results shows that the setting of 
voluntary time limits are less important than the voluntary setting of monetary limits in 
significantly decreasing the theoretical losses among the most gaming intense players. The main 
concern of the analysis presented here is whether the playing behaviour of gamblers significantly 
changes after voluntary limits have been set. Here, the intensity of playing was measured in two 
ways (i.e., ‘theoretical loss’ and ‘play duration’). The results do seem to provide evidence that 
voluntary limit setting has the desired effect in helping the most gaming intense players spend 
less time and/or money on their gambling. Given that the most gaming intense group of players 
set their spending limits below their actual theoretical loss, the results of this study clearly 
demonstrate that the most gaming intense players subsequently set voluntary limits appropriately 
and decreased their time and/or money playing the month after the limits were set. 
 
There are, of course, many limitations with behavioural tracking data. As Auer and Griffiths 
(2011) have noted, behavioural tracking data (i) collects data from only one gambling site and 
says nothing about the person’s online gambling in general (as online gamblers typically gamble 
on more than one site), (ii) always comes from unrepresentative samples (i.e., the players that use 
one particular internet gambling site), (iii) does not account for the fact that more than one 
person can use a particular account, and (iv) says nothing about why people gamble or why they 
engage in a particular online activity (such as limit setting). Another limitation is that once players 
reach their money or time limit, they may simply go and gamble on other online gambling 
websites.  
 
Another more specific limitation in this study was whether the changes in observed behaviour 
were solely as a consequence of the voluntary limit setting.. Most players do not have limitless 
financial resources, therefore a high level of gambling cannot usually be sustained for very long. 
For this reason, high intensity gamblers’ playing behaviour is likely to level off and/or decrease. 
Low intensity gamblers on the other hand are more likely to show an increase in their gambling 
rather than a decrease. In order to be able to make causal inferences, an experimental design 
would have to be constructed. Obviously this is not possible as limit setting is a voluntary event 
that cannot be enforced on players. However, if the results were purely a matter of chance, then 
differences between the types of limits and the types of gamblers would not likely have been 
observed. Many of the observed differences in this study were highly significant and showed that 
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the setting of voluntary limits had a significant effect, and that different types of gamblers played 
differently as a result of voluntary limit setting. 
 
Future analysis of data such as these could also include an examination of the players’ behaviour 
when they get close to their time and money limits. It would be useful to know if they accelerate 
their behaviour (i.e., gamble more aggressively) or whether they reduce their level of gambling 
activity and become more passive. To be more specific, does the setting of limits create targets 
for gambling spend?  Could the setting of limits be counterproductive (i.e., does the option to set 
limits actually encourage greater gambling)? This would help determine whether voluntary limits 
either encourage or inhibit gambling behaviour as the limit is reached. Such analysis might 
provide greater relevance to both public policy practitioners, and the gambling industry. Future 
studies should also investigate limit setting behaviour among less gambling intense players. It 
would be useful to know if this group of players knowingly set themselves limits that are higher 
than their actual gambling intensity. Among this group, the focus of limits would be to slow 
down the increase in gambling intensity rather than decrease the overall gambling intensity (as 
would be the aim among the most gaming intense players). The effect of limits can only be 
investigated by comparing gamblers who set themselves limits with similar gamblers who did not 
set themselves limits.  
 
The focus of this study lies is on voluntary limit setting. The limited empirical evidence suggests 
that mandatory set limits are not liked by gamblers and that they prefer voluntary limits (e.g., 
International Gaming Research Unit, 2007). However, for voluntary limits to be effective in 
protecting players, a certain degree of readiness to change is required. The willingness and 
readiness to change is at the heart of the psychological ‘stages of change’ model (DiClemente & 
Prochaska, 1992; Prochaska & Prochaska, 1991). The ‘stages of change’ model assumes that there 
are varying levels of readiness for people to change their behaviour across five levels (i.e., pre-
contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance). Furthermore, there is an 
oscillation between the different stages. Most vulnerable players who are unable to change may 
only have effective protection via mandatory limits.  
 
It would appear from reviewing the small empirical literature base that there is evidence to 
suggest that most gamblers (irrespective of pathology) try to regulate their spending. 
Furthermore, it would appear from the data presented here that voluntary spend limits have the 
capacity to helpfully assist in that process. The evidence base suggests that the most appropriate 
responsible gambling strategy to be implemented by gaming companies would be for voluntary 
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(rather than mandatory) pre-determined spending limits by players. This is because individuals are 
likely to vary widely in the amount of disposable income that they have available for leisure 
activities such as gambling. Players should therefore be required to set their own self-determined 
spending limits before they commence gambling. This is actually the case for the online platform 
win2day which provided the data for the analysis in this study. Such an action emphasizes 
individual responsibility for managing expenditure. It may also ensure that the player actively 
engages with at least one of the responsible gaming tools on offer. There would appear to be a 
consensus of expert opinion that encouraging player responsibility is a very effective long-term 
and preventive strategy for harm minimization.  One concern regarding low-risk limits is that 
gamblers adhering to these limits may feel they are safe and impervious to harm. A related 
concern noted by Currie, Hodgins, Wang, el-Guebaly, Wynne and Miller, (2008) is that problem 
gamblers may justify continuing to gamble if they report staying within the limits. 
 
Given that research in this important area is rather limited, it is recommended that the 
implementation and ongoing effectiveness of player set limits by gaming operators should be 
carefully monitored and evaluated. Follow-up research is needed to assess the impact of spending 
limits on player behaviour over time. Such research can provide a more accurate evaluation of the 
specific changes made, and can add valuable insight into the efficacy of such responsible gaming 
measures, contributing towards an exchange of best practice for both the national and 
international responsible gambling community. The term ‘limit’ appears to be unpopular, 
therefore the emphasis should instead be placed on offering game management tools that assist 
players in decisions about how much they want to spend gambling. Such management tools 
could also give players information about their actual gambling behavior and advice them based 
on their personal gambling patterns. Monaghan and Blaszczynski (2010) note that such systems 
should help players to reflect on the amount of time or money they have spent, compare 
expenditure to personally set limits, and consider whether they need appropriate self-regulatory 
action. Based on the findings of this study, it would appear that government policy makers, 
gaming regulators, and/or legislators should seriously consider making it mandatory for online 
gaming operators to introduce voluntary limit setting options for their players. This should 
include both time and money limit setting, particularly as time limit setting might be particularly 
good for some types of gamblers (i.e., poker players) whereas spending limits might be 
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Table 1: Types of limit and percentage of occurrence among online gamblers 
 
Limit type Number Percentage 
All online players (n=5000)   
Daily cash-in limit 5,566 25% 
Weekly cash-in limit 6,299 29% 
Monthly cash-in limit 6,947 32% 
Session playing duration limit 1,537 7% 
Daily playing duration limit 1,653 8% 
Total 22,002 100% 
   
Online lottery players (n=3152)   
Daily cash-in limit 3,063 25% 
Weekly cash-in limit 3,525 29% 
Monthly cash-in limit 3,918 32% 
Session playing duration limit 815 7% 
Daily playing duration limit 901 7% 
Total 12,222 100% 
   
Online casino players (n=2,334)   
Daily cash-in limit 2,439 23% 
Weekly cash-in limit 2,981 28% 
Monthly cash-in limit 3,718 35% 
Session playing duration limit 773 7% 
Daily playing duration limit 822 8% 
Total 10,733 100% 
   
Online poker players (n=759)   
Daily cash-in limit 720 25% 
Weekly cash-in limit 863 30% 
Monthly cash-in limit 933 32% 
Session playing duration limit 188 6% 
Daily playing duration limit 189 7% 
Total 2,893 100% 
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Table 2: Impact of limit setting on theoretical loss (€) after limit setting among most 
intense online gamblers (Limit Impact Factor) comparing play 30 days before and 30 
days after limit setting event) 
 
 Cash-in Limit Duration Limit 
 Daily Weekly Monthly Session Daily 
All players (n=5000)      
Mean  0.87 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.9 
(SD) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) 
t value  -4.15 -4.47 -4.47 -2.88 -3.19 
(p) (<0.001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Lottery players (n=3,152)      
Mean  0.88 0.87 0.9 0.92 0.91 
(SD) (0.6) (0.63) (0.6) (0.7) (0.6) 
t value  -3.55 -3.66 -2.96 -2.03 -2.66 
(p) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.01) 0.02 (<0.01) 
Casino players (n=2,344)      
Mean  0.79 0.77 0.8 0.96 0.89 
(SD) (0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (1) (1) 
t value -4.01 -5.03 -3.82 -0.61 -1.68 
(p)  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.27) (0.05) 
Poker players (n=759)      
Mean  0.86 0.84 0.89 0.77 0.73 
(SD) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) 
t value  -2.02 -2.3 -1.59 -3.3 -3.9 
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Table 3: Impact of limit setting on Playing Duration after limit setting among most 
intense online gamblers (Limit Impact Factor) comparing play 30 days before and 30 
days after limit setting event) 
 
 
 Cash-in Limit Duration Limit 
 Daily Weekly Monthly Session Daily 
All players (n=5000)      
Mean  0.95 0.94 0.96 0.99 0.92 
(SD) (0.6) (0.6) (1) (0.8) (0.7) 
t value  -1.86 -2.24 -0.89 -0.28 -2.55 
(p) (0.03) (0.013) (0.19) (0.39) (<0.01) 
Lottery players 
(n=3,152) 
     
Mean  0.91 0.91 0.88 0.92 0.99 
(SD) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (1) (0.9) 
Casino players 
(n=2,344) 
     
Mean  0.91 0.91 0.88 0.92 0.99 
(SD) (0.8) (0.8) -0.8 (1) (1) 
t value -1.72 -1.72 -2.29 -1.22 -0.17 
(p) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.11) (0.43) 
Poker players (n=759)      
Mean  0.93 0.94 0.97 0.73 0.7 
(SD) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4) (0.4) 
t value  -1.52 -0.87 -0.43 -5.85 -6.5 
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